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ABSTRACT 
This rep0rt presents an application of the algebraic framework of 
Montague grammar to Dik's functional grammar. It is demonstrated how in 
this way a modeltheoretic semantics can be associated with the structures 
produced in a functional grammar. In particular, it is shown how scope 
ambiguities can be dealt with. 
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1. Aim 
A functional grammar describes how completely filled predicate frames 
are produced and how from such structures sentences are obtained. So a 
functional grammar is a syntactic device which produces some language (i.e. 
the set of produced sentences). Semantic considerations evidently played a 
role in the design of the structures employed in functional grammar. How-
ever, these structures are not semantically interpreted: functional grammar 
does not assign a meaning to the produced structures. The aim of this 
article is to demonstrate how a functional grammar can be incorporated in 
a system which does deal with semantics as well. The system is an instance 
of the general framework described in Universal Grammar (Montague (1970)). 
Many technical details are taken from the Montague's most influencing 
article: 'On the proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English' 
(Montague (1973), henceforth PTQ). 
The kind of semantics I will consider is known under names as logical 
semantics, model theoretic semantics or truth-functional semantics. I will 
not try to characterise notions such as 'meaning' or 'semantics'. I will 
rather follow the advice of Lewis who says: 'In order to say what a meaning 
is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and then find something that does 
that' (Lewis (1972:5)). 
I wish to formalize those aspects of meaning that allow one to conclude 
from the truth of certain sentences the truth of certain other sentences. 
If th~ sentence John walks and Mary talks is true, then also the sentences 
Mary talks and John walks are true, and vice versa. And if it is true that 
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Every man walks, and that John is a man, then also John walks should be true. 
The meanings associated with FG~structures should formalize the information 
needed to obtain such conclusions. I do not aim at formalizing more aspects 
of meaning. So I am not interested, for example, in describing the precise 
differences between walk and run, or in explaining the deviant use of run in 
running nose. Probably the meanings of sentences considered in this article 
are not surprising for the reader. The interest of these meanings rather 
lies in the method by which they are obtained. 
I will now consider-some sentences of the fragment dealt with in this 
article. They form a subset of the fragment in Dik (1980), which is the 
source of the FG rules I will deal with. 
(1) John runs 
(2) Every man runs. 
The predicate frames related to (1) and (2) are similar: the only difference 
is that in the first position another term is inserted. In analogy with (1), 
which expresses that the individual John has the property of running, one 
might expect that the meaning of (2) is that some object indicated by every 
man has the property of running. In discussing this idea, Lewis tells that 
in the dark ages of logic something like the following was told (Lewis 
(1972:35)). The phrase every man names an entity called 'the universal 
generic man', and this entity has just the properties which every man has. 
Then (2) would mean that the universal generic man has the property of run-
ning. Lewis illustrates what a strange entity this universal entity would 
be. Since not every man is black, or yellow, or of some other specific color, 
the universal generic man is not black, nor yellow, nor of any other color 
(yet neither is he colorless, since not every man - indeed not any - is 
colorless). So this cannot be a sound approach. A better description of the 
meaning of sentence (2) is that every entity that has the property of being 
a man, also has the property of running. This illustrates why the quantified 
term every man is treated in logic differently from the proper name John. 
But in functional grammar both terms are treated the same. Therefore sentence 
(2) constitutes a first basic problem for a semantics in functional grammar. 
Some kind of a method has to be found enabling one to obtain rather diver-
gent meanings for closely related frames. 
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(3) John loves a woman 
This sentence expresses that there is an entity that has the property of 
being a woman and that it stands in the relation of loving to the individual 
John. A sentence which has a predicate frame of the same structure as (3) is 
John seeks a unicorn. This sentence exhibits an ambiguity which is known as 
the 'de-dicto/d~-re' ambiguity. On the de-re reading John is looking for a 
specific unicorn; for instance the one he got for his birthday. This read-
ing implies that there exist unicorns. On the de-dicto reading, however, 
John will be happy with any unicorn he finds. This reading does not imply 
the existence of uniforns. The de-dicto/de-re ambiguity arises in connection 
with intensional verbs such as seek. Since such verbs are not in the frag-
ment this ambiguity will not be treated explicitly. 
(4) Every man loves a woman. 
This sentence is ambigous. There are two possibilities concerning the 
relative scope of the quantified phrases. On the one reading there is a 
single woman loved by every man (say Mother Mary}. On the other reading 
there is for every man some woman he loves (say his mother}. A well known 
variant examplifying the same kind of ambiguity is Every man in the room 
speaks two languages. The ambiguity of (4) is an example from a large class 
of ambiguities: scope ambiguities of quantified term phrases. It is a pure 
semantic ambiguity in the sense that there is no syntactic motivation for 
relating (4) with two different structures. A functional grammar will 
provide as source for (4), on both readings, the same predication. Since 
it is not clear how to obtain two different readings given only one frame, 
we arrive at the second basic problem in providing a semantics for 
functional grammar. Is it possible in a functional grammar to deal with 
ambiguities which are of a purely semantical nature? 
2. Method 
The main principle of Montague's approach is the well-known principle of 
compositionality (or Frege's principle}: 
The meaning of a compound expression is built up from the meanings of 
its constituent parts. 
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This principle is intuitively appealing and is widely accepted (although 
different people may have different interpretations of it). In case we deal 
with strings which are just 'glued' together, it is clear what the parts of 
the resulting expression are: the parts we 'glued' together. But what is to 
be understood by constituent parts in less elementary cases: if the grammar 
does not just glue strings together or does not produce strings? An example 
of the former situation arises when a grammar builds take the apple away 
out of the apple and take away. Functional grammar is an example of the 
latter case since it deals, in most stages of the production process, not 
with strings, but with frames. In order to be able to apply the principle 
in situations which go beyond the most elementary ones, the notions 
'compound expression' and 'constituent part' have to be clarified. 
By a compound expne.J.iJion I will understand an object which is produced by 
a syntactic rule; in a functional grammar these objects are partially or 
completely filled predicate frames, and the sentences which are finally 
obtained. The lexical predicate frames are considered as uneompound expres-
sions. The syntactic rules tell us how expressions are built out of already 
built ones or basic ones. By the eon-0-tltuen:t pa.Jt:t.6 of an expression A, which 
is built using rule R, I understand the expressions B1 , .•• ,Bn out of which 
A has been built using R. The principle now requires that in case we build 
A out of B1 , ••• ,Bn according to rule R, we have to build the meaning of A 
out of the meanings of B1 , ••• ,Bn according to some operation on meanings 
associated with R. So far each construction step in the syntax, there has 
to be a corresponding step in the semantics: i.e. each syntactic rule has 
a semantic counterpart. It is a consequence of the principle of composition-
ality that not only the final outcome of the production process has a mean-
ing, but that all syntactic expressions (structures) encountered in the 
production process have one as well. 
The parallelism between syntactic and semantic rules has as a consequence 
that the meaning of a structure is determined by its syntactic construction 
process. This indicates what kind of answer will be given to the first 
problem of section 1. One and the same predicate frame can only obtain two 
different semantic interpretations if it is produced in the syntax in two 
different ways. A meaning assignment is then a function defined on the set 
of derivational histories, and each derivational history is related to just 
one meaning. Formulated in the terminology of Montague 1970: a meaning 
assignment is a function defined on a disambiguated language, i.e. the 
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language of production trees, and formulated in the terminology of universal 
algebra (the branch of mathematics which deals with structures and their 
relations): meaning assignment is a homomorphism defined on some free 
algebra, i.e. the term-algebra of that language. 
The expressions produced by the grammar will be related to a semantic 
domain. This domain may be viewed as a foX"!Ilal model of reality, in which, 
for instance, (formal representants of) individuals occur, and (formal 
versions of) their properties are modelled. Of certain kinds of expressions 
one might have an intuition how their meanings should be modelled, for 
instance, one is tempted to associate with a two place verb a two place 
relation. But we need a meaning for all kinds of expressions; for the frame 
related to every man, as well as the frame related to the positional 
satellite in the garden. Here the situation is less clear. What are 
reasonable candidates for their meanings? The answer to this question will 
mainly be based upon pure technical grounds. Semantical objects are chosen 
which make the system work; i.e. those objects which make that the 
correct relations between meanings of sentences can be laid. In this way 
the advice of Lewis quoted in section 1 is practised: do not ask what a 
meaning is, but ask what a meaning should do. Often one associates in-
tuitively motivated interpretations with the in this way obtained meanings, 
for instance concerning a model of reality or concerning the processes in 
the human brains. The reader is invited to hold these interpretations as 
long as possible because it might help him to understand why the system 
works. But in case some unintuitive meanings are encountered, a safe 
interpretation of the semantic model is as a collection of abstract mathe-
matical objects which have the required properties enabling us to reach 
our semantical aims. 
The objects in our semantical model are rather abstract things, such 
as truthvalues, functions from pairs of truthvalues to truthvalues (e.g. 
conjunction), functions from objects called entities to truthvalues 
(predicates of entities) etc •. When we relate expressions to such semantic 
objects, we have to be able to describe them. Because it is not convenient 
to do this in some mathematical dialect of English, I will use a suitable 
formal language which is an extension of predicate logic. In order to 
avoid confusion between the expressions produced by a functional grammar and 
' 
the expressions of the logic, I will call the latter formulas. 
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The logic I will use is not an intentional logic, but a variant of 
(extensional) type logic. Working with Montague grammar is often identified 
with using intensional logic, and indeed (nearly) all work in Montague 
grammar does use this kind of logic. Many classical semantic pu:;zles (e.g. 
de-dicto/de-re) involve intensional contexts and require intensional logic 
for their semantical treatment. But Montague's abstract framework does not 
a priori require to use an intensional logic: it is the intensional pheno-
mena which require intensional logic. Since the sentences I will deal with 
do not create intensional contexts, there is no need to use intensional 
logic here. This simplifies the task of explaining the framework, and has 
as a consequence that the formulas (and semantic operations) we will meet, 
are somewhat different, and probably more familiar to most of you, than the 
ones occurring in PTQ. 
I assume the reader to know how to interprete standard predicate logic, 
the interpretation of its extension will be given in the next section. So 
to represent an abstract object in the semantic model (a meaning) it will 
be sufficient to provide some formula of our logical language which repres-
ents that meaning. Notive that different formulas may represent one and the 
same meaning: e.g.~ A$ and$ A~- If we would like to replace some repres-
entation of some meaning by some other representation of the same meaning 
we are free to do so. 
We need an extension of predicate logic in order to be able to represent 
the meanings of parts of sentences. For the sentences mentioned in section 1 
as such, predicate logic suffices. The meanings of (1), (2) and (3) are 
represented in (5), (6) and (7) respectively, and the two of (4) are repres-
ented in (8) and (9). 
(5) run (John) 
(6) Vu [man(u) ➔ run(u)] 
(7) 3u [woman(u) A love(john,u)] 
(8) vv [man(v) ➔ 3u [woman(u) A love(v,u)JJ 
(9) 3u [woman(u) A Vv [man(v) ➔ love(v,u)JJ 
Operations on meanings can be represented by means of operations on 
formulas of the logic. It is important to realise that not every operation 
on formulas defines an operation on the associated meanings. An extensive 
discussion of this subject can be found in Janssen (1978). In 'Universal 
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Grammar' (Montague (1970)) a restriction is described which guarantees that 
the operations on logical expressions correspond with operations on meanings. 
Informally speaking, the new formed expression should contain the unchanged 
representations of the expressions operated upon. Formally in the terminol-
ogy of universal algebra: the operations on logical expr,essions should be 
definable as polynomial operations over the algebra of logical expressions 
(usually formulated as: the operations should be polynomials). Our task can 
now be reformulated as follows. We have to provide for a grammar which 
produces step by step, and in a parallel way, both FG-structures and formulas 
expressing the meanings of these structures. For each basis syntactic 
element (i.e. lexical predicate frame), we have to give some formula, and 
with each syntactic rule we have to associate some (polynomially defined) 
operation on formulas. 
3. John and every man 
Let us consider the production of sentence (10) 
( 10) John walks 
The production of this sentence starts with combining the basic term (11) 
with the verbal predicate frame (12). 
(11) (dlxi: JohnNProp <anim,hum,male> (xi) 0) 
(12) walkv {x: anim(x1))Ag 
According to a rule called 'term-insertion', (11) and (12) combine to (13). 
(13) walkv (dlx.: ·John <anim,hum,male> (x.) n1> 
1. NProp 1. y., Ag 
Next the syntactic function 'subject• is assigned to the term John, and the 
'expression rules' produce sentence (10) from the thus enriched frame. 
As explained in section 1, this production process has to be imitated on 
the level of logical formulas: for the basic frames we have to provide for 
formulas, for the term-insertion rule an operation on formulas. I assume 
that neither the assignment of syntactic functions nor the application of 
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the expressions rules has a semantic effect. Consequently, the semantic 
operations corresponding to such rules are empty actions: the formulas 
remain unchanged. Therefore, I will neglect these two kinds of rules in 
the sequel. 
In the logic we introduce constants for the frames (11) and (12). The 
constant walk is interpreted as a predicat~ of individuals, and the trans-
lation of (13) is (14), being the corresponding constant. 
(14) walk 
The constant John is interpreted as the element in the semantic domain which 
represents the individual John. One may be tempted to associate this constant 
with the frame for John. I will, however, associate a more complex formula 
with that frame. The reason for this has to do with the problem signalized 
in section 1: terms such as John and every man are to be treated on a par 
in the syntax, whereas the meanings of sentences (1) and (2) should differ 
considerably. An explanation of this approach will be given at the end of 
this section. 
In order to be able to give the translation of the frame for John, pre-
dicate logic is extended with a operator A (lamba) and with variables for 
predicates. The A-operator binds variables like the quantifiers 3 and V do. 
The translation of (11) into the logic is (15). 
(15) AP [P(john)] 
In order to understand this translation consider first (16), where P denotes 
an arbitrary predicate. 
(16) P(john) 
This formula expresses that the individual denoted by john has the property 
P. Consider now (15). By means of the symbols AP is indicated that we have 
to 'abstract' from the property pin the expression between the square 
brackets. Formula (15) denotes a function which for each property tells 
us whether that property holds of John or not. Let us write X· for the 
• J 
formula (15). Then X• is the function such that for any predicate Q: 
J 
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true if Q holds for John 
f,,J se otherwise 
One can observe that the translation (15) of the frame for John is the 
characteristic function of his set of properties. Sloppy formulated: (15) 
represents the set of all Johns properties. Let us consider the value 
delivered by X· for the argument man. J . 
x .(man) 
J {
r true 
false 
if man holds for the argument john 
so if man(John) = true 
otherwise, thus if man(John) = false 
From this we may conclude that 
AP [P (john) J (man) = x . (man) 
J 
man(john) 
So the value for argument a of a function expressed as AP[S] equals S, where 
Sis obtained from S by substituting a for each occurrence of P. This 
reduction is known as A-conversion. There are certain restrictions on;..-
conversion, in particular, free variables may not become bound by conversion. 
I will not consider such restrictions in detail. 
Corresponding to the syntactic rule for term-insertion we have to 
provide an operation on formulas. The rule of term-insertion may have a 
lot of different semantic effects: term insertion in the first position of 
an otherwise filled predicate frame, has different semantic effect than in 
the second position of an otherwise empty frame. Since our approach requires 
for each syntactic rule a single corresponding semantic rule, the rule of 
term-insertion has to be split up into several rules which are syntactically 
closely related, but which have different semantical effects. We have as 
one instance of the original term insertion rule the following. 
S-Tr1: Term insertion 1: 
Insert a term a in a verbal predicate frame S of which only the first 
position is not filled. 
The corresponding translation rule is: 
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T-TI 1 : Translationrule for term-insertion 1: 
If a',B' are the translation of a,B as defined in s-rr1 , then the 
corresponding operation on formulas yields (a')B'. 
From now on we will describe such a translation rule by means of its final 
result, so by: 
a' ( B ') . 
This translation rule says that the translation of the verb has to be the 
argument of the translation of the term. So the translation of (13) is 
as follows. 
C 16) 11.P [P(john> J (walk) 
By lambda conversion this can be reduced to (17). 
(17) walk(john) 
Frame (19) for every man is obtained from (18) by means of a rule called 
term-formation. 
(18) manN <anim,hum,male> {xi) 0 
(19) (everylxi: manN <anim,hum,male> (xi) 0 ) 
In the logic we have a constant corresponding with (18), which is interpre-
tated as a predicate of individuals. Frame (18) translates into that 
constant, i.e. into (20). 
{20) man 
Just as was the case with term insertion, the rule for termformation is 
split up because several instances have their own semantic effects. Thus 
we have a rule 
S-UT: Universal Term-formation: 
The corresponding translation rule reads: 
T-UT: AP.Vu [a'(u) + P(u)] 
So the translation of (19) is 
(21) AP Vu ·[man(u) + P(u)] 
This formula denotes the characteristic function of the set of properties 
which hold for every man. Application of S-TI 1 to (19) and (12) yields 
(22) . 
(22) walk (everylx.: man <anim,hum,male> (x.)~) 
V · 1. N 1.)UAg 
Application to the corresponding translation rule yields (23). 
(23) AP [Vu [mc.n(u) + P(u)]] (walk) 
This reduces to (24). 
(24) Vu [man(u) + walk(u)J 
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Here one observes how the first problem of section 1 can be dealt with: 
the two terms John and every man are syntactically treated the same, and 
nevertheless the different meanings (18) and (24) are obtained. This 
effect is due to the use of the A-operator. It is a powerful device which 
makes it possible to have in the syntax an insertion on a certain position, 
whereas for the logical formula the effect can be obtained of a substitution 
on the semantically desired place (which may differ for different applica-
tions of the rule). Referring to this power Partee once said: 'Lambdas 
really changed my life' (lecture for the Dutch Association for Logic, 
Amsterdam 1980). 
4. Love a woman 
Using the FG rule for term formation we may produce out of (25) the 
term (26). 
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(25) womanN <anim,hum,fem> (xi) 0 
(26) (ilxi: womanN <anim,hum,fem> (xi) 0) 
By inserting (26) and the frame for John (frame (11)) into (27) one obtains 
(28) . 
(27) 1ovev(x1 : anim(x1))Po/0 (x2)Go 
(28) lovev(dlx: JohnNProp <anim,hum,male> (xi) 0)Po/0 
(ilxj: womanN <anim,hum,fem> (xj) 0)Go 
A sentence obtained from frame (28) is (29). 
(29) John loves a woman. 
In order to deal semantically with (28) we introduce constants for (25) 
and (27) in the logic. The translation of frame (25) is the corresponding 
constant (30), a predicate of individuals. 
( 30) 1.Jr.man 
The constant (31) for love is interpreted as a two-place predicate. 
(31) Zove 
The translation of frame (27) is, however, somewhat more complex. It is, 
roughly said, a two-place relation in which the arguments have to be 
filled in not simultaneously, but one after the other. Formally speaking, 
it is a higher order function which yields, when applied to an individual, 
a characteristic function of individuals. The translation of frame (27) 
is given in (32). 
(32) AU AV [Zove(u,V)] 
The formation of (26) has to be dealt with by means of a separate 
instantiation of the FG rule for term formation. 
S-ET: Existential term formation 
Out of the noun a(xi) make the term frame (ixi: a(xi)) 
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The corresponding translation-rule is: 
T-ET: AP [3u [a.• (u) A P(u) J J 
So the translation of (26) is 
(33) AP [3u [woman (u) A P(u) J 
This formula is interpreted as the characteristic function of the predicates 
which hold for at least one woman. 
By first inserting the term a woman into frame (27), we obtain a pre-
dicate frame of which only the first position is not filled. To such a 
predicate frame rule S-Tr 1 can be applied. So in order to produce (28), 
we need a new term-insertion rule which fills the second position of (27), 
and a corresponding translation rule. 
S-TI2 : Term Insertion 2 
Insert term a. in position 2 of verbal predicate frame B of which 
only the first and second position are not filled. 
AZ a. I (8 I (Z) ) 
Application of S-TI2 to (26) and (27) yields 
The translation of (34) is obtained by application of T-Tr2 to (33) and (32), 
yielding (35). This reduces by three times A-conversion to (36). 
(35) AZ [[AP 3u [woman(u) A P(u)J] (Au AV [love(u,v)](z)J 
(36) AZ [3u [woman(u) A love(z,u)JJ 
Application of S-Tr 1 to (34) and to the frame (11) for John yields (28). The 
corresponding semantic action consist in the application of T-Tr 1 to (15) and 
(36). Tpis yields (37). 
(37) AP [P(john)](AZ 3u [woman(u) A love(z,u)]) 
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This reduces by twice application of A-conversion to 
(38) 3u [woman(u) A love(john,u)] 
Instead of inserting into (34) the frame (11) for John, we might also 
insert frame (19) for every man. This yields (39). 
(39) 1ovev(every1xi: manN <anim,hum,male> (xi) 0)Po/0 
(ilxj: womanN <anim,hum,fem> (xj) 0)Go 
Application of T-TI 1 to (36) and the translation of every man (21) yields 
(40) , 
(40) AP Vu [man(u) ➔ P(u)] (AZ [3u [woman(u) A love(z,u)]] 
which reduces by A-conversion to (41). 
(41) Vu [man(u) + AZ [3u [woman(u) A love(z,u)]](u)] 
Another application of A-conversion to (41) would have as consequence that 
the rightmost u, which occurs free in the subexpression (u), would become 
bound by 3u, as in (42). 
(42) Vu [man(u) + 3u [woman(u) A love(u,u)]] 
Therefore we first rename the variable bound by 3u. We replace formula 
(41) by (43) which represents the same meaning. 
(43) Vu [man(u) + AZ [3v [woman(v) A love(z,v)]](u)] 
Now we may reduce further, and after A-reduction we obtain (44). 
(44) Vu [man(u) + 3v [woman(v) A love(u,v) JJ. 
One can observe that the production of frame (34) for Every man loves 
' a woman given above, yields the first one of the two readings (8) and (9) 
mentioned in section 2. In order to obtain the second reading we have to 
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produce frame (39) in some other way as well. The first method one might 
think of is to perform the term insertion in the opposite order: first 
inserting the term every man, and next the term a woman. It is not too 
difficult to give such syntactic rules, and the corresponding translation 
rules. Extending such an approach to more complex constructions might not 
be that easy. On the other hand the method introduced in PTQ easily deals 
with the more co~plex constructions and has the advantage that it can be 
used for the treatment of several other phenomena: anaphoric pronouns, and 
the de-dicto de-re ambiguity. Therefore I follow Montague's method. This 
method is as follows. 
The lexicon is extended with a new class of terms. These terms are 
frames consisting of a variable only, and they differ with respect to the 
index of the variable. Examples of such terms are (x7 ) and (x27 ). These 
variables can be called syntactic variables in order to discriminate them 
from variables in the logic; mostly the context will make clear what is 
intended. The syntactic variables have no counterpart in ordinary English, 
and in the course of the process of producing a sentence, they are either 
extended to a full term, or they get the status of anaphoric variables. 
In the syntax the variables are treated like all terms. So in the same 
way as we produced (34), we can now produce (45), applying S-TI2 . 
The translation of a syntactic variable is a formula containing an unbound 
logical variable over individuals bearing the same index. Frame (46) is 
translated into (47). 
(46) (x27 ) 
(47) AP [P (u27 )] 
So frame (45) translates according to T-TI2 into (48). 
(48) AP [P(u27) (AU AV [Zove(u,v) ]) 
By A-conversion this reduces to 
(49) AV [love(u27 ,v>] 
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One may apply S-Tr 1 to (45) and the frame (19) for every man, thus obtain-
ing (50). 
The corresponding translation reduces to 
(51) Vu [man(u) + love(u,u21 >J 
Furthermore a syntactic rule is introduced which has the effect of ex-
panding syntactic variables to full terms or to anaphoric pronouns. This 
rule is in fact a rule scheme which for every possible value of the involved 
index n constitutes a rule. The effect of the rule resembles the effect of 
quantification in logics, in the aspect that the rule 'binds' a variable. 
Therefore it is called a quantification rule. 
S-Qn: Quantification rule for index n 
Make a new predication out of term a and predication~ which contains 
an occurrence of the term (x ), by expanding the first occurrence of 
n 
(x) to a, and expanding the other occurrences of (x) to (Ax). 
n n n 
By 'first occurrence' I understand the leftmost (x) in the highest pre-
n 
dicate frame (in section 5 this detail will be discussed). Expanding (x) 
n 
to a has to be understood as substituting a for x, while replacing the 
n 
index of the x in the term by n (an alternative would be to require in 
S-Qn that the index of the variable in the term bears index n). The 
anaphoric variable (Ax) is by the expression rules developed to an anaphoric 
n 
pronoun. 
Using instance S-Q17 of rule scheme S-Qn we may produce out of (50) 
and (26) the frame (28). Thus we produced (20) along two different produc-
tion processes. 
The translation rule (or rather scheme) corresponding with S-Qn is: 
T-Qn: a'(AU ~•) 
n 
The translation of (28) - if produced in the way just indicated - is obtained 
by combining (33) and (51) in accordance with T-Q17, yielding (52). 
(52) AP [3u woman(u) A P(u)] (Au27 Vu [man(u) + Zove(u,u27 )]) 
After renaming bound variables, this reduces to (53). 
(53) 3u [woman(u) A Vv [man(v) + Zove(u,v)JJ 
This represents the desired second reading of (28). The two production 
processes lead to the same frame, but resulted in different translations 
representing (in this case) two different meanings. 
Another phenomenon for which S-Qn can be applied is coreferentiality. 
Let us first produce (54) and (55). 
(54) walkv (x17)Ag 
(55) talkv (x17 )Ag 
Their respective translations are (56) and (57). 
(56) V(1lk (u17 ) 
(57) talk (u17) 
Let us then combine these frames by the rule for conjunction. 
s-c: Conjunction rule 
Make out of predication a and predication 8 the predication a and S. 
The cnrresponding translation rule reads: 
T-C: a' A 8' 
Application of S-C to (54) and (55) yields (58). 
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Next we combine (58) with frame (11) for John according to S-Q17, producing 
a frame from which we can obtain sentence (59). 
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(59) John walks and he talks 
Application of T-C to (56) and (57) yields 
Combining this with the translation (15) of John according to T-Q17 yields 
(61) AP [p(john)] CAu17 [walk(u 17 ) A taZk(u17)]) 
reducing to 
(62) walk(john) A talk(john) 
Below I will give some translations of frames and rules which indicate 
how parts of Dik (1980) I have not yet considered, can be dealt with. I will 
not, however, present rules for phenomena which either require a complex 
semantic treatment (such as 'question formation' - see Groenendijk and 
Stokhof (1980), 'numbers' - see Bartsch (1973), and 'tense' - see Janssen 
(1980b)), or which have not yet been dealt with adequately in Montague 
grammar (such as 'satellites' - see section 5). The translations for the 
frames for the non-anaphoric pronoun he, for give, and for believe are 
given in (62), (63) and (64) respectively (since believe is an intensional 
verb, a fully correct translation should contain an intensional operator). 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
AP [P (c2 )] 
AU AV AW [give(u,v,w)] 
Au AP believe(u,P) 
c is a constant of the type of individuals 
Pis a variable of the type of translations 
of sentences. 
Finally I will just mention some rules. 
S-DT: definite term formation: 
Make out of the noun frame a{x.) the term frame (dlx.: a(x.)) 
1 1 1 
T-DT: 'AP 3u [Vv [a'(V) ++- u = v] A P(u)] 
S-RC: Relative clause formation: 
Make a noun-frame of the form a(x.):$ as follows. Combine the noun 
1 
frame a(x.) with the predication$ (which has to contain the syntactic 
1 
variable x) by expanding x to a suitable relative pronoun. 
n n 
T-RCn: Au [a'(u) A$'] 
n n 
S-TI3 : Term Insertion 3: 
Insert term a in position 3 of a verbal predicate frame in which posi-
tions 1,2,3 are empty. 
5. Discussion 
In this section I will make some general remarks about the relation 
between functional grammar and Montague grammar. The first remark I want to 
make, concerns the difference between the version of functional grammar 
as it figures in the previous sections and its more standard form. I did 
not make use of all the information present in a predicate frame. Semantic 
functions (e.g. Goal), features (e.g. human), and variables (the x 'sin 
n 
frames) were not taken into consideration. 
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Semantic functions express semantical details, for example that a certain 
position of a frame will contain the goal, and another one the locative 
satellite. The kind of semantics currently used in Montague grammar is not 
yet that refined enabling to take these differences into account. In order 
to do so the logic and the model probably would have to be enriched. We had 
a limited aim (see section 1), for which it was not necessary to bother 
about these details. For larger fragments of English even reaching this 
limited aim is even difficult enough. 
The features provide the information what kind of terms can be put into 
which positions. Certainly, Montague grammar will have to deal with such 
selection restrictions as well, and the information contained in these 
features has to be incorporated somehow. It has both been proposed to do 
so in the semantics by means of partially defined functions (Cooper (1975), 
,. 
Waldo (1979)), and to to so in syntax by means of subcategorization 
(Janssen (1980b)). Either one of these methods could be followed here. 
The role of the variables in functional grammar is taken over, in a new 
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way, by the quantification rules. Since functional grammar was not designed 
together with an explicit formal semantics, it is not too surprising that 
some details had to be changed. 
A parallel between functional grammar and Montague grammar is the tendency 
to eliminate transformations. In transformational grammar it was often their 
semantic relation that motivated a transformational relation between senten-
ces. The basic difference between Montague grammar and transformational 
grammar is that Montague grammar has an explicit semantic component. There-
fore Montague grammar has the possibility to formalize such relations among 
sentences at the level of semantics. Sentences may be produced independently 
syntactically, while their semantic relations can still be dealt with, but 
now in the semantic component. Thomason (1976) treats passive sentences as 
produced independently of the active sentences, and accounts for the relation 
between them in semantics. Gazdar (1980) propagates a context-free - i.e. a 
non-transformational - approach to syntax. Many of his rules are possible 
because his grammar has an explicit semantic component analoqous to that of 
Monta0ue grammar. Several governed transformations are treated non-transforma-
tionally in Dowty (1979), and Bartsch (1979), again by having the semantics 
do the job. So there is a general tendency among Montague grammarians to 
avoid transformations. Not using transformations is one of the aims of 
functional grammar. It is to be expected that many of the results in the 
field of Montague grammar can be applied in functional grammar as well. The 
following is an example. 
How could one allow for the possibility that both (62) and (63) are pro-
duced? 
(62) John serves the cake to Mary. 
(63) John serves Mary. 
In transformational grammars (63) usually is obtained from a source like 
(62) by means of a transformation called 'object deletion'. Dowty (1979) 
does not use a deletion rule. Instead he proposes a rule which makes out 
of the three place verb serve, a two place verb. This rule has no visible 
syntactic effect: the verb obtains the status of a two-place verb without 
changing its form. Semantically, this rule has the effect of introducing 
some ~xistential quantifier. The same idea can be applied in functional 
grammar: deleting nothing, just change the status of the verbal frame (e.g. 
by inserting a dummy term or removing the third position). 
An important difference between functional grammar and Montague grammars 
as they are usually described the literature is that, whereas a Montague 
grammar produces rather natural phrases, a functional grammar produces 
abstract structures in the non-final stages. This has as consequence that 
in a Montague grammar two only superficially different phrases such as (64) 
and (65) are to be considered as different syntactic objects. 
(64) give Mary a book 
(65) give a book to Mary 
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In the more abstract approach of FG they correspond to the same predication, 
leaving it to the expression rules to make the difference. Another example 
of this phenomenon is the active/passive distinction. A functional qrammar 
can have somewhat simpler rules since superficial differences have not to 
be accounted for in the stage where the meaning is determined. 
An advantage of the abstract structures becomes apparent if we consider 
syntactic variables. A Montague grammar produces strings of words, so a 
variable has to be represented as a word. They are represented as a male 
pronoun to which an index is attached: by he and by him. This representa-
n n 
tion has the disadvantage that a~ arbitrary choice is made: the variables 
look 'male' and 'singular'. By later rules these decisions often have to 
be withdrawn. Furthermore one is tempted to consider the variables syntacti-
cally as pronouns, which they are not (Janssen (1980a)). Functional grammar 
has the advantage that syntactic variables can be represented as what they 
really are: abstract elements. No premature decisions have to be taken. 
These syntactic advantages have their price. The frames of a functional 
grammar are rather distinct from real sentences. One might ask whether the 
available abstract information is the kind of information one needs for 
producing correct sentences. In any case, this is not the kind of informa-
tion which traditionally is considered to be of the required kind: a 
constituent structure. Kwee Tjoe Lieng has developed a computer program 
implementing Dik (1981). Consequently he had to be very explicit, in 
particular in the formulation of the expression rules. There turned out 
(Kwee (1979) and Kwee (this volume)), to be a lot of unsolved problems in 
formulating rules producing sentences out of frames. The fact that the 
available structural information is rather abstract, brought me into 
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problems when formulating of S-~n. I will turn to these problems now. 
Pronominal reference is always possible from right to left: a suitable 
pronoun can always refer to a term occurring earlier in the sentence. In 
certain circumstances pronominal reference also is possible in the other 
direction. But it is rather difficult to characterize these situations. So 
in case there are two positions in a sente~ce, one to be filled with a term, 
and the other with a pronoun referring to that term, then a safe strategy 
is to put the term in the leftmost position. This safe strategy is followed 
in PTQ in the formulation of the rule"corresponding to S-Qn. When formulat·-
ing S-Qn in FG this strategy cannot be applied since it is not possible to 
s 
say in advance in which linear sequence the terms will occur in the sentence 
which is finally obtained. The assignment of syntactic functions may have 
as consequence that anaphoric variables,are raised from deep embeddings 
and the expression rules can make that ~he corresponding anaphoric pronouns 
occur earlier in the sentence than the terms they refer to. I do not know 
how to formulate S-Qn in such a way that only correct reference patterns 
result. It is not attractive to try to solve this problem by allowing 
'unrestricted' expansions in S-Qn, and to put restrictions on the rules 
assigning syntactic functions and the expression rules, which would require 
that pronouns should occur to the right of the term they refer to. For this 
would introduce a filter into the grammar since there is no guarantee that 
from a given frame with several pronouns a sentence can be produced which 
obeys the requirements. Such a filter is undesirable from the point of 
view of functional grammar itself. (See section 2.1 in Dik (1981)). 
The safe strategy followed in Montague grammar does not guarantee that 
all the sentences which are produced are correct. Although a pronoun may 
always refer backwards, sometimes it has to be a personal pronoun, and 
somBtimes a reflexive pronoun. Since th~ rules of PTQ do not treat reflexives, 
the sentence John sees him is produced, with the meaning that John sees 
himself. It is difficult to characterize the positions in which a reflexive 
is required. It is even more difficult to characterize the positions where 
forward referring is allowed. In transformational grammars there has been 
some progress in characterizing these two kinds of positions. These charact-
erisations use structural properties (Reinhart (1979)), such as the notion 
C-command. In a PTQ-style grammar plain strings are produced without ~ny 
• 
structure; here a correct treatment of pronouns seems impossible. But one 
might enrich these strings with markers indicating the relevant structural 
information (Bennett (1976)). It would be more straightforward to have 
the grammar produce trees (or equivalently labelled bracketings) instead 
of plain strings. If these trees are of the same as the trees used in 
transformational grammars, then all insights from that field can be used 
in Montague grammar as well. The idea of such a grammar is due to Partee 
(1973), and has been worked out in Partee (1979a,b) and Bach (1979). 
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In a functional grammar structures are produced of a completely different 
kind, so the insights from transformational grammars cannot easily be adop-
ted. This leaves the challenge for the functional grammarians to characterize 
in the terminology of functional grammar the configurations where reflexives 
or forward referring pronouns may occur. This seems to me a very difficult 
task, since a frame does not give much information about the surface forms 
it can take. 
Let me summarize my views on the relation between functional grammar and 
Montague grammar. There is no problem in considering functional grammar to 
be an instance of the framework of Universal Grammar (Montague (1970)). This 
has the consequence that meanings are not considered as to be determined by 
frames as such, but only given by their derivational histories. Derivational 
histories as they are designed in Montague grammar, can be imitated in 
functional grammar. Sometimes a simplification is possible because of the 
rather abstract structures produced in a functional grammar. This same fact, 
however, leaves certain syntactic problems to be solved. Of course, such 
an imitation may have the effect that certain production processes of 
functional grammar have to be changed; an example is the relative clause 
construction given in section 4 (for a discussion see Partee (1973) and 
Janssen (1980a)). In any case the program for dealing with semantics in a 
functional grammar is established. One has to provide for formulas for the 
basic frames, and for each rule a (polynomially defined) operation on 
formulas. 
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